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Abstract
Objective: Legitimacy-based approaches to crime prevention operate under the assumption that
individuals—including violent offenders—are more likely to comply with the law when they
believe that the law and its agents are legitimate and act in ways that seem inherently “fair” and
“just.” While mounting evidence finds an association between such legitimacy-based programs
and reductions in aggregate levels of crime and violence, no study has investigated whether such
programs influence individual offending. This study evaluates the effectiveness of one such
program—Project Safe Neighborhoods’ (PSN) Offender Notification Meetings—at reducing
individual recidivism among a population of returning prisoners in Chicago.
Methods: This study uses a quasi-experimental design and two types of survival analyses (Cox
hazard models and competing risk models) to evaluate the effects of PSN on the subsequent
recidivism of program participants relative to the control group.
Results: Cox hazard models and competing risk models suggest that involvement in PSN
significantly reduces the risk of subsequent incarceration. In fact, participation in PSN Offender
Notification Forums is associated with a significant lengthening of the time that offenders remain
on the street and out of prison.
Conclusion: This study provides some of the first individual-level evidence of the efficacy of
such programs on patterns of individual offending. Results suggest that interventions such as
these do indeed reduce rates of recidivism in the treatment group.
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INTRODUCTION
While deterrence-based crime reduction strategies remain the mainstay of criminal justice
policy, a series of innovative and promising programs has emerged based on the concepts of
procedural justice and legitimacy. The underlying premise of such programs is that individuals—
including violent offenders (Papachristos, Meares and Fagan 2012)—are more likely to comply
with the law when they believe that the law and its agents are legitimate and act in ways that
seem inherently “fair” and “just” (Tyler 1997). Programs that enhance the legitimacy of the law
and police should foster higher levels of compliance. Examples of programs demonstrating
characteristics of procedural justice potentially leading to legitimacy include Boston’s Operation
Ceasefire (Braga, Piehl and Hureau 2009), Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative
(Papachristos, Meares and Fagan 2007a), and North Carolina’s Drug Market Initiative (Kennedy
and Wond 2009). Each of these initiatives relied upon two strategies: one that informed
participants of the consequences of illegal conduct consistent with theories of deterrence and
two, promoting legitimacy by recasting law enforcement interactions with the offending
population. Instead of employing hierarchical and aggressive tactics that typify deterrence-based
police-offender interactions, these programs conveyed the consequential messages in a nonthreatening manner along side community stakeholders. Additionally, the meetings with
offenders where held in places of civic importance, such as libraries, community centers, and
churches. Thus, despite the centrality of informing offenders of the consequences of bad choices,
the interventions themselves were specifically crafted to be transparent and fair, as well as
promote a sense of police legitimacy.
Research supports the efficacy of such a legitimacy-based approach to crime prevention.
In addition to the mounting evidence that legitimacy is related to aggregate crime rates (Corsaro,
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Brunson and McGarrell 2009; Kirk and Matsuda 2011; Kirk and Papachristos 2011; McGarrell
et al. 2010) and more general compliance with the law (Tyler 1997), there is an agreement in the
experimental policing literature that legitimacy based policing strategies are associated with
reductions in aggregate levels of crime (see Braga and Weisburd 2012). However, to the best of
our knowledge, no study has yet explored the extent to which legitimacy-based programs impact
the level of individual offending. That is, while mounting evidence exists of the community-level
impact of legitimacy based programs, we still do not know if the individual participants in such
programs adjust their behavior accordingly.
To address this shortcoming, using a quasi-experimental design, we examine how an
intervention designed to enhance legal legitimacy influences recidivism among a group of
recently released felons who participated in Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)
program. We combine the design of the PSN field experiment itself with individual data on
recidivism and socio-demographic characteristics to assess the programmatic effects of Offender
Notification Forums: an intervention that brought together offenders, police, community
stakeholders, and service providers in an hour long meeting regarding levels of violence in the
community, the implications of the offenders’ continued participation in violence, and the
provision of services tailored specifically to the needs of re-entering offenders. Cox hazard
models and competing risk models suggest that involvement in the PSN program significantly
reduces the risk of subsequent incarceration: indeed, attendance at PSN Forums is associated
with a significant lengthening of the time that offenders remain on the street and out of prison.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the premise behind the growing interest
in legitimacy based crime prevention strategies. Next, we describe the design and
implementation of the Offender Notification Forums. Finally, we present the results of our
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survival models as well as the implication for policy and research.

BEHIND OFFENDER NOTIFICATION FORUMS: FOCUSED DETERRENCE AND PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE
This study examines the efficacy of a specific type of legitimacy-based program aimed at
reducing recidivism—Offender Notification Forums (hereafter, “Forums”). Although the actual
architecture of these Forums varies by municipality2, the underlying structure and idea are
consistent. At their core, Forums are brief meetings (typically no more than an hour long)
bringing together law enforcement, community stakeholders, service providers, and active
offenders. The message of the meeting is straight-forward: "Your community needs the violence
to stop and we'd like to help you and those in your group/gang/crew stop that violence.”
Participants are warned that they have been “put on notice”: the law enforcement community is
aware of their involvement and, should they continue shooting, law enforcement will be working
together to focus on the violence in this area. Any subsequent violent behavior on their part will
result in all of the stakeholders pulling every available “lever” (enforcement and civil action)
against the offender and his group (Corsaro et al. 2012; Kennedy 1996; McGarrell et al. 2010).
The primary theoretical principle undergirding the Forums is procedural justice-based
legitimacy. Broadly defined, legitimacy is “the widespread belief among members of the public
that the police, the courts, and the legal systems are authorities entitled to make decisions and
who should be deferred to concerning matters of criminal justice” (Tyler 2010, p. 127; also,
Tyler 1997). The legitimacy of the police and courts is often determined through the perceived
fairness of the manner in which this authority is exercised—a process called procedural justice
(Tyler 1997). To summarize this growing area of theorizing and research, if interactions with
legal authorities and the procedures for criminal justice are thought to be fair and just then
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individuals are more likely to (a) view those agents of the law as legitimate and (b) comply with
the law, even when behavior is not directly monitored (Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Huo
2002). Programmatic efforts focusing on procedural justice aim to increase the legitimacy of
legal actors and authorities, and in so doing, increase levels of compliance.
The Offender Notification Forums analyzed here rely on the notion that an offender’s
perceptions of the law and by extension his compliance with the law can be increased through
positive and legitimate interactions with police. Namely, interactions and interventions that are
conducted in a way that is fair and just should increase overall beliefs in the legitimacy of the
law and subsequent compliance. Evidence for such an approach can be found in Paternoster et
al’s (1997) study of a domestic violence program in which offenders were more likely to say that
their detention or sentence was “fair” when they were treated with respect by police and
prosecutors. More recently, Papachristos et al’s (2012) study on 141 active gun offenders in
Chicago finds that respondents’ opinions of the law were indistinguishable from those found in
the general population estimates such as those by Tyler and Huo (2002)—i.e., criminals, not just
non-criminals, express a belief in the moral foundation and legitimacy of the law. Criminals
differ from non-criminals, however, when their expressing more negative interactions and
opinions with the police (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2012). That is even though criminals
believe in the substance of the law, they do not believe that many of the agents of the law are
legitimate. Nonetheless, this study finds that perceptions of legitimacy do influence compliance:
offenders with more positive views of the police were less likely to carry a gun or get into a fight
(Ibid.).
The Forums aim to strengthen the legitimacy of the police and the criminal justice system
and therefore compliance among a very specific population—those offenders actively involved

Page 5 of 39	
  

in crime and violence. One might think this a Herculean task as the offender population invited
to the Forums focus are young minority males, a population more likely to have more
interactions with law enforcement agents than other groups, which they often view as negative
(Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007; Hagan, Shedd and Payne 2005). Consider the recent
debates surrounding the “stop-and-frisk” practices in New York City. Fagan and colleagues
(Fagan et al. 2009) have estimated that the probability of being stopped by police for AfricanAmerican men ages eighteen to nineteen residing in New York City in 2006 was between 78%
and 80% while the corresponding probabilities for Hispanic males and non-Hispanic white males
for the same time period were 35% and 45% and 10% and 13% respectively. More troubling is
the fact stops were more likely to lead to arrest for whites than for blacks. Young minority men
not only have increased contact with the police, but also with other actors in the criminal justice
system. Nearly 1 in 3 black men between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine is under
correctional supervision (jail, prison, probation, or parole) and incarceration is now the modal
experience for black men without a high-school diploma as roughly sixty percent will experience
incarceration during their lifetime (Western 2006). It is likely that these high levels of contact
lead to negative perceptions. Research demonstrates that these young men, like African
Americans generally, have a high preponderance of negative opinions of the criminal justice
system and especially police (Fagan et al. 2009; Hagan, Shedd and Payne 2005).3
The program analyzed here (and those related to it; for a review, see McGarrell et al.
2010) takes as its goal changing the perceptions of legitimacy among a population of young men
known to have high levels of mistrust and cynicism towards the criminal justice system and low
levels of procedural justice (Fagan and Piquero 2007). More than that, the Forums are attempting
to alter the perceptions of active offenders—a population that many criminological theories
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assume to have less regard for the law and its agents than their law-abiding counterparts (for
example Reisig, Wolfe and Holtfreter 2011; Sherman 1993; Wolfe 2011) and are differentially
effected by sanction threats (Loughran et al. 2012).
To date evaluations of Forums and similar programs have been extremely encouraging.
Cities employing Forums as part of focused deterrence strategies include Boston (Braga, Hureau
and Papachristos forthcoming; Braga et al. 2001), Chicago (Papachristos, Meares and Fagan
2007a), Cincinnati (Engel, Tillyer and Corsaro forthcoming), and High Point, NC (Corsaro et al.
2012) and in all of those instances, the targeted communities experienced a reduction in
aggregate rates of violence (see Braga and Weisburd 2012 for a review). However, only the
Chicago study (Papachristos, Meares and Fagan 2007a), which is a strategy designed explicitly
to leverage the potential benefits of legitimacy-based compliance, actually measured and
compared the effect of attending a Forum vis-à-vis other forms of intervention. Papachristos and
colleagues (2007) find that the percentage of the offending population in a community that
attends such a Forum exerts the greatest crime reduction effect in their analysis, greater than the
number of federal prosecutions, sentence length, and heightened gun policing.
While mounting evidence suggests that such legitimacy based efforts are associated with
declines in aggregate levels of crime and violence, no study to the best of our knowledge has
examined the impacts of Forum attendance on individual outcomes. The present study addresses
this shortcoming by analyzing the effect of Forum participation on individual recidivism among
individuals recently released from prison who participated in the Chicago Project Safe
Neighborhoods Program.

PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO
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Since 2002, a Department of Justice funded program called Project Safe Neighborhoods
(PSN) has been implemented in Chicago with the specific charge of reducing the city’s high
levels of homicide and gun violence. Under the direction of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois, Patrick Fitzgerald, PSN brought together local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies with community based organizations and researchers with the specific
purpose of devising context-specific gun violence reduction strategies. In practice, PSN entailed
not a single program, but rather a series of related initiatives directed towards specified
communities. As summarized by Papachristos et al. (2007) these efforts included: (1) increased
federal prosecutorial attention for all gun-related crimes; (2) the creation of a local and federal
review system of all gun-related cases brought before the court; (3) the creation of a multiagency gun enforcement team; (4) community and media outreach campaigns; (5) school based
educational programs; and (5) the Offender Notification Forum.
PSN efforts were focused in two ways: geographically and individually. Geographically,
all of these efforts were directed towards specified areas of the city—essentially two police
districts on Chicago’s west-side that include the West Garfield Park, North Lawndale, and the
Austin community areas. While PSN areas were selected chiefly because of political pressure
over rising rates of violence, subsequent problem analyses revealed that these areas (at least in
part) would have risen as likely candidates for PSN since at the time of the intervention they had
some of the highest and most stable crime rates in the city (Papachristos et al. 2007). Indeed,
homicide rates in the PSN districts at the time of the intervention in 2002 were approximately
75.5 per 100,000, a staggering 350 percent higher rate than the overall city average of 22.3 per
100,000 (which itself was incredibly high). This non-random selection notwithstanding,
propensity score modeling and the timing of the intervention permitted the creation of a quasi-
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experimental design that matched neighborhoods within the intervention areas with other highcrime neighborhoods in other parts of the city.
Within the treatment areas, PSN programs with the exception of the school-based and
community outreach efforts were directed specifically towards “active” offenders, meaning those
individuals who were known by authorities to likely be involved in criminal and gang activities.
Prior research suggests that the majority of violence is highly concentrated among small
segments of the male population (Braga 2003; Loeber and Farrington 2011; Papachristos, Braga
and Hureau 2012; Wolfgang 1958). More importantly, such findings encouraged PSN,
demonstrating that focused deterrence efforts directed at this population might very well be the
most efficient way to reduce overall levels of homicide and gun violence.
Papachristos and colleagues’ (2007) evaluation found strong and consistent support for a
crime reduction effect of PSN on neighborhood-level rates of homicide and violence. Using
individual level growth curve models and propensity scores to adjust for nonrandom group
assignment of neighborhoods, Papachristos et al. (2007) found a that PSN efforts were associated
with a roughly 37 percent reduction of quarterly homicide rates in the treatment areas as
compared to the control areas. Specific treatment effects were measured for all of the PSN
initiatives, but the results consistently show that the largest effects were associated with the
Offender Notification Forums.4 The impact of the Forums were measured as “saturation,” the
percentage of the eligible offending population within the community that had attended a Forum
with a one percentage increase in the saturation associated with an approximately 13 percentage
point decrease in the neighborhood-level log homicide rate (Papachristos et al. 2007, pg. 256).
PSN-style Offender Forums, and other similar legitimacy based meetings, increased in
popularity and have shown significant associations with reduced levels of crime in other
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municipalities. Nearly all of this research, however, analyzes changes in aggregate (usually citywide) crime rates. The main objective of this study is to pick up where this prior research leaves
off by examining the influence of Forums on individual patterns of co-offending. If the
legitimacy based philosophy of Forums is driving the observed crime reductions, then it might be
operating at the level of the individual—namely, offenders who attend these meetings might be
changing their behavior. Before testing this hypothesis, we first describe in a bit more detail the
design, architecture, and implementation of the Forums.

FORUM DESIGN, ARCHITECTURE, AND IMPLEMENTATION
The Offender Notification Forums are one-hour long meetings in which members of the
PSN team sit down with a group of approximately 25 individuals recently released from prison.
Individuals are randomly selected to attend the Forums based on three criteria: (1) residence in
the target communities, (2) at least one prior gun-related or violent offense in their criminal
records, and (3) recently release from prison (the preceding 3 to 6 months). Individuals selected
to attend the meeting received a standard invitation letter in the mail, as well as a follow-up letter
and phone call from their parole/probation officer. Attendance was not mandatory, and
attendance rates were on average above 65 percent. Often times, individuals missing a meeting
would attempt to quickly reschedule for the next meeting. The first Forum was held in January
2003 and continues to the present day.
As mentioned above, the overarching goal of the Forums is to alter the generally negative
opinions offenders might have of law enforcement while simultaneously delivering the
deterrence-based message. The guiding principle of the PSN team was to accomplish this
objective by designing an intervention that changed the interactions between law enforcement
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and offenders. As such, the PSN team drafted and monitored the Forums to ensure that they
proceeded with these guiding principles in mind during all aspects of program.5
First and foremost, the setting of the forum is aimed at creating an environment that
conveys equity among all parties and participants. Rather than hold the forums at a law
enforcement venue, the forums are held at places of “civic importance,” such as parks,
community colleges, or churches. Holding the forums in a neutral setting makes the offenders
more comfortable as well as changes the power dynamics between law enforcement and
offenders because of the neutrality of the location. The signal is subtle but essential: you are not
in custody; this is a safe place in your community. The physical arrangement of the meeting
conveys a similar message because the Forum is conducted in a round. Speakers are not
segregated to the front of the room with the participants facing them classroom or lecture-style.
Instead, tables are chairs are arranged in a circle; speakers and participates face each other and
speakers generally do not stand when they give their message. Thus, the Forum atmosphere that
is not didactic or authoritarian, but rather “we’re all at the same table”—a message that resonates
in with the content of Forum.
Coupled with an egalitarian atmosphere is a firm yet fair deterrence principle: treat
people like ‘normal’ adult citizens, give them a choice, and respond as promised when they reoffend. This message is delivered in three parts: (1) law enforcement efforts, (2) the ex-offender
experience, and (3) social service provision. The Forums begin with the law enforcement
message, which is a simple one: if you pick up a gun or are involved in a gun-related crime after
this meeting, the people in this room will “pull every [deterrent] lever” at their disposal to
enforce the law (the Kennedy 1997). Here, representatives from the multiple law enforcement
agencies, such as the Chicago Police Department, ATF, Cook County State’s Attorney, and the
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United States Attorney’s Office, speak regarding the various avenues they can take to arrest and
prosecute returning gun offenders. Special attention is paid to the consequences of federal
prosecutions relative to state-level penalties. Recent PSN related cases—those that occurred with
PSN districts—are described in detail, and while forum attendees are often familiar with the
defendant, they are often surprised to hear the sentencing outcomes.
While the main thrust of the law enforcement message is deterrence focused, it
nonetheless is coupled with the sense of choice and respect. That is, law enforcement speakers
stress their concern for the overall levels of violence in the community, and suggest that they too
hope the offenders “change their ways” since they are most likely to be a victim. Illustrative of
this approach, one local prosecutor’s remarks at the forum concluded as follows:
We don’t want to see you again, because, if we do, it’ll be either on a piece of
paper as someone who picked up a gun, or as a victim. I see too many people
hurt and, believe it or not, I don’t want to see you on a slab. Go out and be
producers. Don’t destroy the community any more.6
Thus, after the powerful delivery of the deterrence-centered messages, law enforcement speakers
reiterate the central themes of fairness, encouraging the attendees to engage rather than offend.
The ex-offender segment of the Forum is usually run by a single individual who has
successfully stayed away from offending for several years and, most often, is actively engaged in
community activities. This speaker’s message stresses the seriousness of the current levels of
violence in the community, the problems of intra-racial violence, the truth about gang life
(including its meager financial rewards), the troubles offenders face when looking for work, and
the seriousness of the PSN enforcement efforts. This section tends to be the most motivational
and emotional of the three as the speaker makes particular empathetic connections to the
attendees.
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Consistent with the legitimacy-based message, the ex-offender messages underscore the
theme of change and how the PSN team is giving them an opportunity—a “heads up”—on what
will happen to them should they pick up a gun. Change is difficult but possible as one speaker
put it:
There’s a saying, ‘Change is a choice, but accountability is a guarantee.’ They
[pointing to the law enforcement members] are sitting here and telling you they
[are] coming after you [if you leave here and pick up a gun]. Gonna hold you
accountable. Ain’t no one ever tell me that. Now, I don’t mean no disrespect,
but if you ain’t listening, you got to be a fool…I changed. It was a choice, a
real hard one. But I did it…Once you change your life around, you’ll have a
whole new respect for others and yourself.
The final segment of the Forums entails a series of presentations and discussions by
representatives from community, educational, health, and employment service providers. The
speakers from the local social service providers enforce the message that re-offending is a
choice, though, in tandem with that point, they offer options and support. These speakers will
often talk about the programs they work for and services that they offer. For example, one local
service provider often discusses how their agency helps ex-offenders obtain licenses and other
documents they need to apply for jobs. In essence, their message is “we’re here for you; here are
some local things you might need to succeed.” Both the ex-offender and the community social
service provider messages provide something different for the offenders. Rather than a
deterrence message that law enforcement often gives, the ex-offender and the community social
service providers convey that it is possible to stay crime-free, and there is local support to help
the ex-offender remain crime free.
The meetings typically last the allotted one hour. Based on the observations of the
authors, roughly half of the attendees at any given meeting quickly leave the meeting without
chatting to anyone else. The other half of the attendees, however, often stayed behind talking
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with service providers, signing up for services, and simply talking with members of the PSN
team. Indeed, it was quite common for such conversations to last an additional hour with
informal conversations spilling out into the corridors and street. And, often, those informal
conversations included candid discussions between attendees and local, state, and federal law
enforcement.

DATA AND METHODS
Data sources
In order to test the effect the PSN program has on recidivism, we employ individual level
recidivism data provided by the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)7. This data contains
the population of individuals released from prison between 2001 and 2006 in Cook County,
Illinois, who have had a felony weapons violation at some point in time in their criminal history.
Essentially, this is the population of offenders who would be eligible to receive the PSN
treatment. Data contains detailed information on each re-entering individual, including any reincarcerations during the study years, individual sociodemographic characteristics, date of
release, offense description, gang membership, zip code of release, and finally, participation in
the PSN program.
To test the effects of the PSN Forums, we examine the recidivism patterns for the first
cohort of individuals who were eligible for PSN. Keeping with the overall quasi-experimental
design described by Papachristos et al. (2007), we restrict the data to the districts that served as
the site of the PSN intervention. This enables us to compare those that received the PSN
treatment or lived in a PSN neighborhood to other returning offenders who live in a comparable
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neighborhood in regard to sociodemographic characteristics and crime rates rather than to the
whole of Chicago.

Recidivism and Time to Re-arrest Measures
Recidivism is defined as any re-incarceration during the study years. Because we are
analyzing a long time frame, there is the possibility of multiple rearrests for one individual.
Therefore, we explore only the first re-arrest event contained within the data. Additionally, for
our sample, individuals are right censored when they do not recidivate during the study years. In
the event that an individual is rearrested, we calculate, in months, the time between their release
into the community from the prior offense to the date of their re-arrest; we refer to this measure
as time on the street.
Re-arrest events were characterized in three ways. First, we delineated recidivism as a
binomial variable of 0 – was not rearrested, and 1 – was re-arrested. Second, we characterized
recidivism from a competing risks stand point where individuals were censored, arrested for a
new offense, or arrested for a technical violation. Lastly, we also characterized by Uniform
Crime Report offense types, namely, murder, violent crimes, violent property crimes, drug sales,
drug possession, weapons violations, other property crime, drug conspiracies, and other UCR
crimes. In this case, recidivism is coded as arrested for the UCR crime of interest versus arrest
for some other crime.

Independent Variables and Controls
The main independent variable of interest is designation showing whether or not a
returning prisoner was part of the PSN program and attended the offender forum. Of the 4,420
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individuals in the data, 238 (approximately 5 percent) were part of the PSN program. We
designate this by a dummy variable representing that the individual was part of the PSN
Experimental Group. Other controls included dummy variables for Black (1 = yes), whether the
returning prisoner had a high school diploma or equivalent (1 = yes), children (1 = yes), were
married (1 = yes), were cohabitating with a significant other (1 = yes), a gang member (1 = yes),
or living in the experimental PSN neighborhood (1 = yes). Additionally, we controlled for age in
years, and the number of prior incarcerations, where 0 meant no previous incarcerations, 1
equaled one prior incarceration, 2 equaled two prior incarcerations, and 3 equaled three or more
prior incarcerations. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all variables used in our models.

[--- Table 1 about here ---]

Modeling Strategy
In this paper, we employ two types of survival analysis: Cox proportional hazard models,
and competing risk hazard models. First, we estimate the time to re-arrest using the Cox
proportional hazard models, which do not assume any specific shape for the underlying survival
function (i.e., who is not rearrested) (Lee and Wang 2003; Wu and Tuma 1991; Yamaguchi
1991). Here, the hazard rate is affected by the independent variables, not the survival function
(Allison 1984; Allison 1995). The model is written as:
ℎ 𝑡 = ℎ! 𝑡 exp  (𝛽! 𝑥! + ⋯ + 𝛽! 𝑥! )
The hazard function given the values of the covariates xk for cases one through k is
denoted by h(t,…) for survival time t. The baseline hazard is represented by h0(t). Failure is
measured as any re-arrest within the time period of our study. Finally, individuals who were not
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rearrested during the study period are right censored. These models will allow us to understand
the general effects that participation in the PSN program has on time to re-arrest.
While the PSN program aimed to reduce recidivism in general, it more specifically
sought to reduce the occurrence of new violence and gun offenses. Standardized Cox models will
not allow for the differentiation between various classifications of re-arrest events. Therefore, we
employ competing risk models to determine the risk of re-arrest for one type of offense versus
another. Competing risk models are most commonly specified in medical and public health
research where the researcher is interested in time to failure (for example, death) from the
disease of interest, controlling for the possibility that failure can occur through other means. In
this study, we are interested in how participation in PSN Forums in time to re-arrest for new
sentences, controlling for the fact that re-arrest can also occur via technical violations (and vice
versa), for example. As such, are concerned about time to re-arrest, or the failure function, rather
than the time to survival. We employ competing risk hazard models to model the following
competing risks: (1) new sentences versus technical violations, (2) murder versus non-murder
rearrests, (3) violent crimes versus non-violent crime rearrests, (4) violent property crimes versus
non-violent property crime rearrests, (5) drug sales versus non-drug sale rearrests, (6) drug
possession versus non-drug possession rearrests, (7) weapons violations versus non-weapons
violations re-arrest, (8) other property crime versus non-other property crime rearrests, (9) drug
conspiracies versus non-drug conspiracies re-arrest, and finally, (10) other UCR crimes versus
non-other UCR crime re-arrest. As before, individuals who were not rearrested during the study
period are right censored. We consider a competing risk an event that has occurred and prevents
the occurrence of the specified event of interest	
  (Fine and Gray 1999). As with most recidivism
studies, returning prisoners can recidivate due to a new offense or a technical violation; we want
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to consider both of these possibilities without lumping them into one all-encompassing
recidivism outcome. Thus, we specify a competing risk model where the primary failure is
recidivism due to the new offense and the competing risk being that of technical violations.

RESULTS
Overall Recidivism: Within and Between Neighborhoods
Table 2 displays the coefficients and hazard ratios for the Cox hazard models estimating
the time to failure for any incidence of recidivism. These models will give us a general
perspective on how the PSN treatment and control groups fair in regards to recidivism, holding
the neighborhoods that received treatment constant.
[--- Table 2 about here ---]
We begin Model 1, the within neighborhood model, which compares individuals within
the PSN experimental neighborhood who attended a Forum to those who did not attend a Forum
but also live in the neighborhood. Model 1 demonstrates that returning prisoners who are Black,
a current gang member or have one or more prior incarcerations have a higher hazard of overall
recidivism. Returning prisoners who are older have an increased hazard of recidivating, though
this effect is marginally significant (p < 0.10). Conversely, returning prisoners with a high school
or equivalent degree and children have a lower likelihood of recidivating. Additionally, our
treatment variable is highly significant and negative. Returning prisoners who attended a Forum
have a hazard of only 43 percent that of individuals within the same neighborhood who did not
attend a Forum. At first glance, receiving PSN treatment lengthens a returning prisoner’s time on
the street.
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The between neighborhood model (Model 2) compares individuals returning to either the
PSN treatment neighborhoods or the control neighborhoods who attended a forum to those who
did not attend. In Model 2, we see the statistical significance of many of the same controls:
Blacks, current gang members and older individuals have a higher hazard of recidivism. On the
other hand, returning prisoners with a high school diploma or GED, are married, or those with
children have a lower hazard of recidivating. Like before, the treatment variable is significant:
returning prisoners who received the PSN treatment have a hazard of recidivating that is 42.7
percent of returning prisoners who did not receive treatment. The control variable for the PSN
experimental neighborhood is non-significant, suggesting that the experimental and control
neighborhood are no different in regards to overall recidivism. These general results indicate
strongly that the PSN program significantly reduces the likelihood of recidivism and keeps those
that do receive treatment on the street longer than returning prisoners who do not. For instance,
when looking at the within-neighborhood model, individuals in the PSN program face a hazard
of recidivating that is 56.9 percent less than those individuals who are not in the PSN program.
Figure 1 displays the hazard curves for the two treatment and control groups, holding all
controls constant. Here, we see that when examining either the within-neighborhood or betweenneighborhood findings, that upon exit, both the treatment and control groups have similar
hazards for re-arrest. However, after a year (12 months), the hazard curves are strongly
differentiated with the treatment group (the top line) having higher survival rates (i.e., no
recidivism) over time. At 60 months, nearly 40% of the PSN treatment group has not recidivated
while less than 10% of the control group has.
[--- Figure 1 about here ---]
New Sentences versus Technical Violation Recidivism: Competing Risk Hazard Models
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While the above results indicate the PSN treatment has a rather strong effect on lowering
the likelihood of recidivism in general and increasing time on the street, they do not offer a
detailed view of the types of recidivism happening among the returning prisoners. Table 3
presents a competing risk hazard model where the primary risk is recidivism due to new crimes
and the competing risk is recidivism due to a technical violation of parole. Like the previous
section, we present our results in two models: within neighborhood competing risks and
between-neighborhood competing risks models.
[--- Table 3 about here ---]
We begin with the controls in the within neighborhood model, or Model 1, in Table 3.
First, individuals with a high school diploma or equivalent and those who are older have a
reduced incidence of a new sentence failure compared to younger returning prisoners or those
without a high school diploma. Conversely, current gang members and individuals with prior
incarcerations have a higher incidence of a new sentence failure. Given the results of the overall
recidivism models, these findings are expected.
The coefficient for the treatment variable offers additional insight into the effect of the
PSN on recidivism for offenders who attended a Forum. The sub hazard for the PSN group
controlling for other variables is about 70 percent of the sub hazard for the control group. In
other words, the cohort of returning prisoners receiving PSN treatment have a reduced incidence
of a new sentence failure compared to the control group controlling for personal characteristics
and the fact that technical violations can also occur. Simply, offenders in the PSN experimental
group were less likely of committing a new crime than their counterparts. Given that the
coefficients for the PSN Experimental Group are nearly identical for the within- and betweenneighborhood models, we interpret the hazard ratio similarly. Thus, individuals who attended
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PSN Forum face a hazard of committing a new offense that is 30 percent less than those
individuals who did not attend.
The between neighborhood model finds similar results. As before, we see that returning
prisoners with a high school diploma or equivalent have a reduced risk for a new sentence
failures. Similarly, there is a reduced hazard of new sentences for older ages. On the other hand,
Blacks (though moderately significant), individuals with multiple prior incarcerations, and who
are current gang members have an increased risk of failure due to new sentences versus a
technical violation. The PSN treatment variable is again significant; we see that the sub hazard
for the PSN group controlling for other variables is about 69.8 percent of the sub hazard for the
control group. Thus, individuals in the PSN program face a hazard of committing technical
violation that is nearly 70 percent less than those individuals who are not in the PSN program. As
before, the PSN experimental neighborhood is non-significant, suggesting that the experimental
neighborhood and control neighborhood are no different in regards to the likelihood of failure to
new sentences or technical violations. Lastly, the control for the experimental neighborhood is
not significant – again showing no significant difference in the hazard of new sentences across
the two neighborhoods.
Figure 2 is a comparison of the cumulative incidence new sentences and technical
violation failures for our two treatment groups: those individuals in the first cohort and those in
the second. The cumulative incidence shown here is the ratio of individuals in that particular
group who have failed to those in the total population over time. In both graphs, the cumulative
incidence rate is lower for both treatment groups than the control group.
[--- Figure 2 about here ---]
[--- Table 4 about here ---]
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To contrast understanding the hazard of new sentences, we also ran a competing risks
model where technical violations are the primary risk of interest; Table 4 presents the results
from this model. Technical violations are of particular concern to PSN; while the project's goal is
to lower new gun crimes, PSN hopes to keep returning prisoners from re-arrest or incarceration
through exposure to resources often needed to meet their parole conditions. Interestingly, in the
technical violations models, some differences emerge amongst the controls which are significant.
Here, Blacks are no more like to recidivate from a technical violation than non-Blacks.
Additionally, individuals with children have only 95 percent of the hazard of technical violation
recidivism (approximately, across the two models) as those without children. Like we saw in the
new sentence competing risk models, the PSN experimental group has a significantly lower
hazard of technical violations than their counterparts; indeed, they have only 30 percent of the
hazard for technical violations than those in the control group. This finding is consistent across
both the within and between neighborhood models.
In sum, all models presented here show that the PSN experimental group, in general, is
less likely to fail. Additionally their hazard for failing from a new sentence is only 60 percent
that of the control group. For technical violations, the difference is even more drastic: they have
only 30 percent of the hazard of failing from a technical violation when controlling for the
possibility of new sentences. Specifically, the individuals in the PSN experiment are not only
less likely to return to prison due to a new sentence, but also much less likely to return to prison
because of a technical violation. For the first cohort of the PSN treatment group, in essence, the
PSN message is working to reduce new crimes and technical violations among these individuals.

Recidivism by Type of Crime: Competing Risks Hazard Models
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Ultimately, PSN is aimed at reducing gun violence—a message central to the Forums. As
such, just as it is essential to know the hazard of new sentences versus technical violations for the
treatment and control groups, we also look at the hazard of recidivism to of certain categories of
UCR crimes. In Table 5, we display the abbreviated results from these models. Like before, we
focus on the within-neighborhood and between-neighborhood distinctions. The controls are
suppressed in Table 5; the only coefficient displayed is the PSN Treatment variable8.
[--- Table 5 about here ---]
Of the nine UCR crimes that were tested, the PSN treatment group had significantly
reduced hazards for recidivating from four of the UCR crimes. Like the previous models, we
differentiate between within neighborhood models (experimental neighborhood only models)
and between neighborhood models (experimental v. control neighborhood models). First, we find
that the sub hazard for drug possession versus any other crime for the PSN group, whether in the
within or between neighborhood model, is significantly lower than the sub hazard for the control
group. The sub hazard for the experimental group is about 63 percent of the sub hazard for the
control group; this is across both within and between neighborhood models.
Most relevant for our analysis, however, is the effect of PSN treatment on the hazard of
committing a weapons crime, a murder, or a violent crime versus any other crime. Overall, the
findings here are reflective of the PSN message being offered to returning offenders in the
program. First, the sub hazard of murder (i.e., the hazard of committing murder versus any other
crime) for the PSN group, whether in the within or between neighborhood model, is significantly
lower than the sub hazard for the control group, so small that the sub hazard is only 3/10,000th of
a percent in the between neighborhood model and 1/100,000th of a percent in the within
neighborhood model. In the between neighborhood model that accounts for all neighborhoods in
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the study, the PSN treatment group also has a reduced sub hazard for committing a violent crime
over any other crime. Here, the sub hazard for the experimental group is 51.4 percent of the sub
hazard of the control group. The sub hazard for committing a weapons crime over any other
crime is also lower for the treatment group: 10 percent of the sub hazard for committing a
weapons crime than any other crime. In conclusion, we see that with these competing risk
models for crime type that the hazard of recidivating through any of the crimes particularly
targeted in the PSN treatment is much lower for the experimental group than for the control
group. Thus, the PSN message is effectively lowering the incidence of these types of crimes
among the target population.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Legitimacy based violence prevention and crime reduction programs like PSN’s Offender
Notification Forums are guided by a central principle: strengthening perceptions of legitimacy
and the perceived fairness of the law leads to higher compliance with the law, even among
highly-criminal populations. To date, such legitimacy driven programs have shown to reduce
aggregate levels of crime (Braga, Hureau and Papachristos forthcoming; Braga et al. 2001;
Carsaro et al. 2012; Engel, Tillyer and Corsaro forthcoming; Papachristos, Meares and Fagan
2007b), yet no study has investigated the role that legitimacy plays in changing individuals’
behavior. This study does just that, finding notable reductions in recidivism among a population
of parolees returning to Chicago neighborhoods. Our findings are threefold and described below.
First, our results show that attendance at a PSN Forum effectively lengthens participants’
time on the street—i.e., people who attend a forum, on average, stay out of prison for longer
periods of time. When comparing individuals within the same neighborhood, individuals who
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attended a PSN Forum have a 41% chance of recidivating before offenders in the control group
do; effectively, they are more likely to remain on the street than the control group. Thus, holding
constant the neighborhood conditions, PSN participation considerably lowers the likelihood of
recidivating. We find this effect across all PSN neighborhoods. This finding suggests that the
legitimacy-based message has an effect on individual behavior within neighborhoods that tend to
have high-levels of legal cynicism (Kirk and Papachristos 2011).
Secondly, we find that the PSN effect holds for both new offenses net of technical
violations; put another way, PSN reduces the likelihood of both a new offense and a technical
violation occurring for offenders that attended a PSN forum. In brief, individuals who attended
PSN Forum face a hazard of committing a new offense that is 30 percent less than those
individuals who did not attend a forum. Keep in mind that using competing risk hazard models,
we control for the possibility of technical violations as well as other individual characteristics.
This finding is telling: attending a PSN reduces the hazard of being arrested for a new criminal
offense, thus facilitating some types of criminal desistance.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we find that the PSN attendees have lower hazards
of committing certain serious crimes, such as a weapons crime or a murder. For instance, the
subhazard for committing a weapons crime over any other crime is lower for the PSN group: 10
percent of the subhazard for committing a weapons crime than any other crime. The competing
risk models for crime type show that for those in the PSN experimental group their hazards of
committing certain crimes (i.e., murder, drug possession, and weapons crimes) are lower than the
control group. For instance, the PSN treatment group has a 9% (1/10) chance of committing a
weapon crime or a less than 1% (1/100) chance of committing murder before the control group.
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Consequently, PSN is shown to be rather powerful in reducing the likelihood of committing new
offenses.
The study has a few limitations that should be noted. First, while the benefit of our
sample is that it consists of serious, active offenders, it is also a downfall: we do not know how
the Forums might influence less serious offenders. Relatedly, our sample size is smaller as a
consequence of the population; with the universe of offenders, the effects may change. Second, it
is also possible that altering perceptions of legitimacy and procedural justice have differing
effects on juveniles given that their peer groups are more important during this stage of adult
development, especially where deviance is concerned (Haynie and Kreager Forthcoming; Warr
2002). Finally, the study takes place in Chicago. Chicago is unique in that is has areas of durable
inequality and crime. A program such as PSN may have different effects in other cities. Future
research on legitimacy and procedural justice would be benefited by examining individuals in
other cities, such as juveniles or those who are less serious offenders.
Limitations notwithstanding, this study has weighty implications for legitimacy-based
and focused deterrence strategies. Programs like the Offender Notification Forums appear to
exert significant effects on individual behaviors when directed towards those most likely to be
engaged in street violence. Put another way, when individual offenders are engaged in fair and
just manner, our results suggest that they modify their behavior (stay out of prison longer by reoffender at lower rates). In a sense, this finding provides a partial answer to the question posed
by Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2012): “Why do criminals obey the law?” Although further
research is clearly needed, our results suggest that offenders—just like the general citizenry—are
more likely to comply with the law when they are treating fairly and perceive the agents of the
law as acting fairly. More than that, our findings suggest that negative perceptions of the law
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might be altered based on positive interactions and initiatives. And, programs like Chicago’s
PSN Offender Notification Forums might offer one such option.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Time on the Street (in months)
Black
Age in Years
High School Graduate
Number of Children
Married
Cohabitating
Prior Incarcerations
Current Gang Affiliation
First Cohort
Second Cohort
Experimental Neighborhood
Total Recidivism
No Recidivism
New Offense Recidivism
Technical Violation Recidivism
New Offense: Murder
New Offense: Violent
New Offense: Violent Property
New Offense: Drug Sales
New Offense: Drug Possession
New Offense: Weapons
New Offense: Other Property
New Offense: Drug Conspiracy
New Offense: Other
N = 4220

Mean or %
18.38
96.05%
35.31
50.86%
1.94
13.02%
1.27%
2.23
60.39%
8.67%
8.35%
99.68%
72.14%
31.22%
31.96%
36.82%
1.11%
6.81%
8.22%
8.00%
38.75%
9.78%
1.30%
0.39%
5.67%
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SE
0.36
0.18
0.03
0.02
-

Minimum Maximum
0
70
0
1
18
77
0
5
0
3
-

Table 2: Cox Hazard Models Modeling Time on the Street and Overall
Recidivism
Within Neighborhood
Between Neighborhood
Model
Model
Hazard
Hazard
Coefficients Ratios
Coefficients Ratios
Black
0.457***
1.580***
0.247***
1.281***
(0.116)
(0.183)
(0.0930)
(0.119)
Age
0.00529*
1.005*
0.00432*
1.004*
(0.00314)
(0.00316)
(0.00245)
(0.00246)
High School Educated
-0.588***
0.556***
-0.569***
0.566***
(0.0519)
(0.0289)
(0.0403)
(0.0228)
Children
-0.0665*** 0.936***
-0.0555*** 0.946***
(0.0150)
(0.0141)
(0.0116)
(0.0110)
Married
-0.0766
0.926
-0.120**
0.887**
(0.0661)
(0.0612)
(0.0513)
(0.0455)
Cohabiting
0.295*
1.343*
-0.0231
0.977
(0.155)
(0.208)
(0.143)
(0.140)
Gang Member
0.0174
1.018
0.00608
1.006
(0.0284)
(0.0289)
(0.0216)
(0.0218)
Number of IL Incarcerations
1.288***
3.624***
1.301***
3.674***
(0.0694)
(0.251)
(0.0513)
(0.188)
PSN Experimental Group
-0.841***
0.431***
-0.852***
0.427***
(0.0995)
(0.0429)
(0.0983)
(0.0419)
PSN Experimental
Neighborhood
-0.0290
0.971
(0.0379)
(0.0368)
Observations
2564
2564
4220
4220
Log Lik
-12924
-12924
-22508
-22508
Chi
958.8
958.8
1585
1585
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 3: Competing Risk Models with New Sentences as the Primary Risk of
Interest
Within Neighborhood
Between Neighborhood
Model
Model
Hazard
Hazard
Coefficients Ratios
Coefficients Ratios
Black
0.328
1.388
0.346*
1.413*
(0.229)
(0.318)
(0.179)
(0.254)
Age
-0.0110*
0.989*
-0.0180*** 0.982***
(0.00571)
(0.00565)
(0.00444)
(0.00436)
High School Educated
-0.305***
0.737***
-0.358***
0.699***
(0.0869)
(0.0641)
(0.0695)
(0.0486)
Children
-0.0196
0.981
-0.0122
0.988
(0.0238)
(0.0233)
(0.0190)
(0.0188)
Married
-0.0745
0.928
-0.0486
0.953
(0.110)
(0.102)
(0.0857)
(0.0816)
Cohabiting
0.141
1.151
0.256
1.291
(0.295)
(0.340)
(0.239)
(0.309)
Gang Member
0.504***
1.656***
0.557***
1.745***
(0.0498)
(0.0824)
(0.0381)
(0.0665)
Number of IL Incarcerations
0.790***
2.203***
0.676***
1.966***
(0.112)
(0.248)
(0.0830)
(0.163)
PSN Experimental Group
-0.359**
0.699**
-0.359**
0.698**
(0.181)
(0.127)
(0.181)
(0.126)
PSN Experimental
Neighborhood
0.0353
1.036
(0.0618)
(0.0640)
Observations
2564
2564
4220
4220
Log Lik
-5477
-5477
-8994
-8994
Chi
317.2
317.2
538.4
538.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Page 30 of 39	
  

Table 4: Competing Risk Models with Technical Violations as the Primary Risk of Interest
Within Neighborhood
Between Neighborhood
Model
Model
Hazard
Hazard
Coefficients
Ratios
Coefficients
Ratios
Black
0.327
1.386
0.0845
1.088
(0.202)
(0.281)
(0.134)
(0.146)
Age
0.00934**
1.009**
0.0131***
1.013***
(0.00474)
(0.00478)
(0.00350)
(0.00355)
High School Educated
-0.431***
0.650***
-0.436***
0.647***
(0.0875)
(0.0568)
(0.0668)
(0.0432)
Children
-0.0576**
0.944**
-0.0514*** 0.950***
(0.0232)
(0.0219)
(0.0177)
(0.0168)
Married
0.0508
1.052
-0.0376
0.963
(0.109)
(0.114)
(0.0803)
(0.0773)
Cohabiting
0.117
1.125
-0.283
0.753
(0.286)
(0.322)
(0.270)
(0.204)
Gang Member
-0.307***
0.735***
-0.327***
0.721***
(0.0376)
(0.0277)
(0.0278)
(0.0200)
Number of IL Incarcerations
0.996***
2.706***
1.067***
2.905***
(0.105)
(0.284)
(0.0789)
(0.229)
PSN Experimental Group
-1.184***
0.306***
-1.206***
0.299***
(0.202)
(0.0617)
(0.200)
(0.0599)
PSN Experimental
Neighborhood
-0.0484
0.953
(0.0548)
(0.0522)
Observations
2564
2564
4220
4220
Log Lik
-6160
-6160
-11190
-11190
Chi
314.0
314.0
571.4
571.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 5: Cox results for separate crimes
(coefficients)
Within
Neighborhood
Comparison
Murder
-18.22***
(0.408)
Violent Crime
-0.660
(0.403)
Violent Property Crime -0.505
(0.391)
Drug Sales
-0.205
(0.324)
Drug Possession
-0.455***
(0.137)
Weapons
-2.216***
(0.709)
Other Property Crime
0.584
(0.609)
Drug Conspiracy
0.738
(0.854)
Other Crime
0.301
(0.340)
N
2,564
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Between
Neighborhood
Comparison
-14.93***
(0.293)
-0.666**
(0.403)
-0.453
(0.390)
-0.187
(0.321)
-0.474**
(0.137)
-2.281***
(0.707)
0.683
(0.597)
0.812
(0.818)
0.322
(0.331)
4,220
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Figure 1: A Comparison of the Hazard Curves for the Two Treatment and Control groups

Hazard Curves for the Two Treatment and Control Groups
Between Neighborhood

.8
Survival
.4
.6
.2
0

0

.2

Survival
.4
.6

.8

1

Cox proportional hazards regression

Within Neighborhood
1

Cox proportional hazards regression

0

20

40
analysis time

60

80

0

20

Control Group
Tx Group 1

40
analysis time

60

Control Group
Tx Group 2

Page 33 of 39	
  

80

Figure 2: Comparison of Time on the Street by New Sentences and Technical Violation Failures
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The Forums were conducted in several police districts and each district had slight variations in

forum structure due to the space available within the district (i.e., the Forum location) but also
the varying actors that were involved. Overall, though, the variations across forums are slight.
3

Indeed, African Americans as a group have higher levels of mistrust in the police, more

negative opinions of law enforcement, and tend to live in communities with higher levels of legal
cynicism (Kirk and Papachristos 2011; Skogan 2006; Weitzer & Tuch 2004). The effects of such
dramatic racial disparities in incarceration influence other life chances including employment
(Western, 2006; Pager, 2003) and individual health and mortality (Schnittker and John, 2007;
Wildeman, 2012), and additionally impacts the incarcerated’s family members and children
(Wildeman, 2010; 2012).
4

Interestingly, law enforcement partners were initially most skeptical of the Forums,

affectionately referring to it as the “hug-a-thug” meeting.
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5
The PSN team was vigilant of the structure and implementation of the Forums, often
conducting “re-boot” sessions when new individuals joined the efforts to ensure the consistency
of the message and its delivery.
6

The following quotes are taken from the ethnographic fieldnotes of the first author whom

observed dozens of these meetings during the study period.
7

All data analysis represents the views of the authors, not the state of Illinois or the Illinois

Department of Corrections.
8

As noted before, the controls in the model include: Black, Age, High School Educated,

Children, Married, Cohabiting, Gang Member, Number of Illinois Incarcerations. Additionally,
for the within-neighborhood models, we include a control for the PSN experimental group while
for the between-neighborhood models, we include both the variables for the PSN experimental
group and the PSN neighborhood group.
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